



27th Annual DNB Research Conference

The Macroeconomic Effects of Geopolitical Uncertainty

De Nederlandsche Bank

EUROSYSTEM

Geopolitical Surprises and Macroeconomic Shocks

A Tale of Two Events

Jetro Anttonen and Markku Lehmus

Bank of Finland

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
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Starting point

”How to measure the macroeconomic effects of adverse geopolitical events on euro area economy?”

- **Geopolitical events are extremely heterogeneous.**
- The heterogeneity needs to be taken into account.
- Identification of a homogeneous geopolitical shock tells us very little of the total macroeconomic effect of any geopolitical event of interest.

Geopolitical Risk Index (GPR)







Source: Caldara & Iacoviello (2022)

So what do we do?

- We jointly identify multiple macroeconomic shocks that drive the euro area HICP and GDP.
- We interpret these shocks as transmission channels through which (adverse) geopolitical surprises can transmit to the euro area economy and map the events of interest to a handful of macroeconomic shocks.
- We investigate the effects of two recent major geopolitical events on euro area inflation and GDP:
 - Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
 - Outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023

And what do we find?


- Due to heterogeneity, **the effects of adverse geopolitical events on euro area inflation are context dependent and event-specific.**
 - On the other hand, the effects of adverse geopolitical events on euro area production are typically negative.
- Whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine had a substantial inflationary effect, the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war had a deflationary effect on euro area inflation.
 - However, both events seemed to have a surprisingly large negative effect on euro area GDP.




Geopolitical uncertainty shock

- Impulse responses to a homogeneous geopolitical uncertainty shock (identified using the GPR index of Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) can be interpreted as **average effects** of heterogeneous geopolitical events.
- Zero inflation response does **not** mean that adverse geopolitical events would not affect euro area inflation. It only means that the response is zero **on average**.
→ Inflation response to a random adverse geopolitical event is just as likely to be positive than negative.

Stylized illustration




Another stylized illustration



Data/Model

- SVAR model of the form: $y_t = a + A_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + A_p y_{t-p} + B \varepsilon_t$.
- Non-Gaussian shocks → Shocks are statistically identified.
- 5 variables → 5 shocks.
- Data spans from 1995M01 to 2024M03.
- Mixed frequency data: quarterly observations of GDP, monthly observation of all the other variables.


Euro area real GDP



Additional identifying restrictions

Variables	Shocks				
	Supply	Demand	IP Demand	Geopol. Uncert.	Oil
HICP	+	+			
IP	-	+			
GDP	-	+			
GPR	0	0	0	+	0
Oil					+

Table: Restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of the shocks used for identification and labeling, i.e. sign- and zero restrictions on the components of the parameter matrix B .



Estimation


- We sample from the posterior distribution of parameters (and monthly GDP values) using a Hamiltonian MC algorithm (NUTS; total est. time ~ 20 min).
- Flat priors on B (contemporaneous effects of the shocks).
- Hierarchical Minnesota priors on A_1, \dots, A_p (autoregressive parameters).

$$p(\theta|y) = \frac{p(y|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(y)} \propto p(\theta) \underbrace{|\det(B)|^{-T} \prod_{i=1}^n \prod_{t=1}^T f_i(\varepsilon_{it}(\theta); \gamma)}_{\text{likelihood}}, \quad (1)$$


The outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war

- The outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023 seemed to weaken euro area demand by more than geopolitical surprises of similar magnitude (as measured by GPR) do on average.
 - No effect on euro area supply.
- **Deflationary effect on euro area inflation and large negative effect on euro area GDP.**


Demand Shocks




IP Demand Shocks




Geopol. Unc. Shocks




Supply Shocks




Oil (Price) Shocks





Inflation



GDP








Shock contributions to the deviation of HICP and GDP from their projected paths




The Russian invasion of Ukraine

- In the context of the euro area economy, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February-March 2022 manifested itself as a massive negative supply shock and as a similarly massive adverse geopolitical uncertainty shock.


→ **Inflationary effect on euro area inflation and large negative effect on euro area GDP.**

(Negative) Supply Shocks**IP Demand Shocks****Geopol. Unc. Shocks****Demand Shocks****Oil (Price) Shocks**



Inflation



GDP



Shock contributions to the deviation of HICP and GDP from their projected paths



To conclude

- Due to heterogeneity, **the effects of adverse geopolitical events on euro area inflation are context dependent and event-specific.**
- Some adverse geopolitical shocks have deflationary effect on euro area inflation (e.g., the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war), some have inflationary effect (e.g., the Russian invasion of Ukraine).
- With respect to GDP things seem more straight forward:
adverse geopolitical shocks tend to have significant negative effect on euro area GDP.

Thank you!