Discussion of Optimal Monetary Policy with  $r^* < 0$ by Roberto Billi, Jordi Galí and Anton Nakov

#### Salvatore Nisticò

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### Overview

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- How do we think about a permanently negative  $r^*$  in New Keynesian models?
  - **O** Demographics: OLG (perpetual-youth) framework as in Galí (AEJ:Macro 2021)
  - Idiosyncratic uncertainty: HANK models

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  - Idiosyncratic uncertainty: HANK models
- How can a CB deal with a permanently negative  $r^*$  (and the ensuing permanent liquidity trap)?
  - **1** It should gradually take the economy to a higher-than-target inflation rate
  - It can still lean against transitory shocks through full commitment, despite the permament LT
  - (2) It can rule out sunspots by means of a nonlinear Taylor-type rule, despite the permanent LT

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     ✓ how to talk the PS into the merits of a rule that calls for a policy-rate hike in a deflation? Learnability?

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# Comments: The OLG framework

• Takes the implications of demographics seriously when it comes to the labor market

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#### Critical (innocuous?) assumptions for isomorphism with benchmark NK model

- firms' survival rate and distribution of new equity shares
- $\Rightarrow$  kills financial-wealth effects on consumption
  - $\checkmark$  implications for steady state real interest rate
  - $\checkmark$  implications for IS equation
  - ✓ implications for welfare-based loss function (Nisticò, JEEA 2016)

Graph

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  - ✓ implications for IS equation
  - ✓ implications for welfare-based loss function (Nisticò, JEEA 2016)
  - definition of intertemporal social welfare function
- $\Rightarrow$  only considers generations alive at t
  - ✓ time consistency of optimal consumption plans? (Calvo and Obstfeld, Ecma 1988)
  - ✓ implicit assumption: planner's generational-discount factor equals agents' time-discount factor?
  - ✓ implications for welfare-based loss function (Nisticò, JEEA 2016)

Graph

Nisticò and Seccareccia (2022)

- Low-MPC Savers and high-MPC Borrowers, Idiosyncratic uncertainty
  - $\Rightarrow \text{ Stochastic transition between types:} \quad \textit{pr}(\mathcal{B}_{t+1}|\mathcal{S}_t) = 1 \textit{p}_{s}; \quad \textit{pr}(\mathcal{S}_{t+1}|\mathcal{B}_t) = 1 \textit{p}_{b}$

 $\Rightarrow\,$  precautionary-saving and "anticipative-borrowing" motives

- Credit frictions on the intermediary sector (leverage constraint à la Gertler and Karadi, 2011)
  - $\Rightarrow$  Role for Unconventional Monetary Policy
- $\Rightarrow$  Cyclical consumption inequality

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- $\Rightarrow$  Steady-state real interest rate

$$r^* = -\log\beta - \log\Gamma_s \tag{1}$$

where

$$\Gamma_s \equiv p_s + (1 - p_s) U_c(\bar{C}_s)^{-1} U_c(\bar{C}_b)$$

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 $\Rightarrow$   $r^* < 0$  if

 $\begin{array}{ll} \checkmark & \Gamma \equiv \bar{C}_s \, / \, \bar{C}_b > 1 : \mbox{ steady-state consumption risk for savers } & \Rightarrow & \Gamma_s > 1 : \mbox{ precautionary saving } \\ \checkmark & \Gamma \mbox{ and/or } 1 - p_s \mbox{ large enough } \end{array}$ 

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• With a-cyclical inequality and constant CB balance sheet  $\Rightarrow$  perfect isomorphism (BGN, 2022):

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma^{-1} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^*)$$
(2)

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• With cyclical inequality and constant CB balance sheet  $\Rightarrow$  near isomorphism (Bilbiie, 2018):

$$x_t = \Phi E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma_x^{-1} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^*)$$
(3)

with  $\Phi\equiv 1+\delta(\chi-1)(1-\gamma_s)$  and  $\gamma_s\equiv p_s/\Gamma_s$ 

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• With cyclical inequality and variable CB's reserves  $\hat{u}_t \Rightarrow$  generalised IS schedule (NS, 2022):

$$x_{t} = \Phi E_{t} x_{t+1} - \sigma_{x}^{-1} (i_{t} - E_{t} \pi_{t+1} - r_{t}^{*}) - \delta E_{t} \Delta u_{t+1} + z^{-1} \delta (1 - \gamma_{s}) (E_{t} u_{t+1} - \bar{u})$$
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- ✓ Transmission channels of UMP:
  - "borrowing-cost channel": savers/borrowers ⇒ direct effect on borrowers through long-term rate (Sims et al., REStat 2022)
  - additional "idiosyncratic-risk channel": stochastic transition (p<sub>s</sub>, γ<sub>s</sub> < 1) ⇒</li>
- direct effect on savers through precautionary saving
- **③** additional "cyclical-inequality channel": counter-cyclical inequality ( $\chi$ , Φ > 1) ⇒ GE amplification through compounding of future UMP

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• Case I. a-cyclical inequality and constant CB balance sheet (BGN, 2022):

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma^{-1} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^*)$$
(4)

$$\pi_{t} = \beta E_{t} \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_{t}$$
(5)  

$$i_{t} = \max\{0, r^{*} + \pi^{*} + \phi_{\pi} \pi_{t} + \phi_{x} x_{t}\}$$
(6)

⇒ **Determinacy condition** (Bullard and Mitra, JME 2002):

 $(1-eta)\phi_x+\kappa(\phi_\pi-1) > 0$ 

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(7)

• Case II. cyclical inequality and constant CB balance sheet (Bilbiie, 2018):

$$x_t = \Phi E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma_x^{-1} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^*)$$
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$$\pi_{t} = \beta E_{t} \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_{t}$$
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$$i_{t} = \max\{0, r^{*} + \pi^{*} + \phi_{\pi} \pi_{t} + \phi_{x} x_{t}\}$$
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⇒ Determinacy condition:

$$\sigma_{\mathsf{x}}^{-1}\Big[(1-\beta)\phi_{\mathsf{x}}+\kappa(\phi_{\pi}-1)\Big]>(1-\beta)(\Phi-1)$$

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• Case III. cyclical inequality and variable CB's reserves (NS, 2022):

$$\begin{aligned} x_{t} &= \Phi E_{t} x_{t+1} - \sigma_{x}^{-1} (i_{t} - E_{t} \pi_{t+1} - r_{t}^{*}) - \delta E_{t} \Delta u_{t+1} + z^{-1} \delta (1 - \gamma_{s}) (E_{t} u_{t+1} - \bar{u}) \end{aligned} \tag{4} \\ \pi_{t} &= \beta E_{t} \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_{t} \end{aligned} \tag{5} \\ i_{t} &= \max\{0, r^{*} + \pi^{*} + \phi_{\pi} \pi_{t} + \phi_{x} x_{t}\} \end{aligned} \tag{6} \\ u_{t} &= \bar{u} - \psi_{\pi} \pi_{t} - \psi_{x} x_{t} \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

#### ⇒ Determinacy condition:

$$z^{-1}\delta(1-\gamma_s)\Big[(1-\beta)\psi_x+\kappa\psi_\pi\Big]+\sigma_x^{-1}\Big[(1-\beta)\phi_x+\kappa(\phi_\pi-1)\Big]>(1-\beta)(\Phi-1)$$

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 $\Rightarrow$  Taylor Principle not necessary for determinacy, if UMP active enough

✓ Local determinacy even under **permanent liquidity trap** if UMP appropriately specified:

$$z^{-1}\delta(1-\gamma_{\mathfrak{s}})\Big[(1-\beta)\psi_{\mathfrak{x}}+\kappa\psi_{\pi}\Big]>\sigma_{\mathfrak{x}}^{-1}\kappa+(1-\beta)(\Phi-1)$$

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# Transition paths: the benchmark NK model



Figure: BGN: no idiosyncratic uncertainty, no UMP

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# Transition paths: the "conventional" THANK model



Figure: Idiosyncratic uncertainty, no UMP

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# Transition paths: the "unconventional" THANK model



Figure: UMP shuts down idiosyncratic-risk channel

more gradual and less costly transition to higher  $ar{\pi}$ 

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 $\Rightarrow$ 

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# Stochastic simulations: the benchmark NK model



Figure: BGN: no idiosyncratic uncertainty, no UMP

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# Stochastic simulations: the "conventional" THANK model



Figure: Idiosyncratic uncertainty, no UMP

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# Stochastic simulations: the "unconventional" THANK model



# Stochastic simulations: the "unconventional" THANK model



- Awesome paper: very insightful
- Communicability of the policy rule; learnability of the resulting equilibrium
- What underlying economic environment?
- A role for unconventional monetary policy?

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# The distribution of financial wealth across generations

Corporate equities and mutual fund shares by age

