

Discussion

**Dynamic Effects of Industrial Policy  
Amidst Geoeconomic Tensions**

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The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and **do not** necessarily represent the views of the Bank of Spain or the Eurosystem.

## Summary

- Dynamic two-country open-economy model of heterogeneous firms
- with trade in tasks (high and low-skill labor)
- and endogenous entry, exporting and offshoring decisions.
- Long- and short-term effects of a set of industrial policies
  - i) import tariffs, ii) offshoring frictions, iii) domestic production subsidies and iv) entry subsidies
  - ... and a combination of them.
- Calibrated for US and China.

## Summary (II/II)

**Short-term** effects dominated by **demand shifting**: change in factors demand and exchange rates movements.

**Long-term**: the endogenous **entry** of local varieties dominates welfare effects.

- Import tariffs: short term losses ( $\downarrow$  consumption) but positive long-term welfare effects ( $\uparrow$  entry of local producers).
- Offshoring frictions: short-term gains ( $\uparrow$  low-skill wages) but long-term losses ( $\uparrow$  costs,  $\downarrow$  entry)
- Production subsidies: both short ( $\uparrow$  wages) and long-term gains.
- Entry subsidies: short term losses ( $\downarrow$  consumption) but long term gains ( $\uparrow$  varieties).

The combination of import tariffs + production subsidies is the superior strategy.

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## Comments: **The Role of Intermediate Inputs**

- Positive long-term effects of import tariffs at odds with the literature.
- One sector-setting without intermediate inputs.
  - ▷ Network amplifies the negative impact of distortions
- Should we think of your results as imposing tariffs only to **final consumption goods**?
- Reinterpretation of offshoring as global value chain:
  - ⇒ different *workers* as intermediate sectors.
  - ⇒ Offshoring frictions as *import tariff on intermediate inputs*.

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- In the model, exporters **produce only domestically** and **sell abroad**  
...but domestic firms with offshoring activities sell **only domestically**.
- This misses the policy-relevant role of multinational enterprises  
(*e.g. wooing Chinese EV vehicles to set factories in Europe*)
- In the model *US offshorers* and *Chinese offshorers* behave symmetrically, but there might be implications for the trade policies.
- In the data, your calibration implies a much **larger share of Chinese than US offshorers**.
  - Could be confounded with Chinese MN firms operating and selling in the US?

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... but not exit (random probability  $\delta$ )
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- ⇒ If *endogenous exit* is an additional channel of efficiency, policies such as production subsidies or protectionist measures could be shutting it down.

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