

The Tipping Point: Low Rates and Financial Stability^{a,b}

Davide Porcellacchia

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European Central Bank

^aLink to the paper's latest version on www.dporcellacchia.com.

^bThis paper represents my own views, not necessarily those of the European Central Bank or Eurosystem.

What is the effect of low interest rates on financial stability?

Very quick answer:

- Excessively low rates lead to bank insolvency.
- With the right model, we can quantify the tipping-point rate.

Effect of low rates on bank profitability.

- Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann (2017), Altavilla, Boucinha, and Peydró (2018), Claessens, Coleman, and Donnelly (2018), and Ampudia and van den Heuvel (2019).

Effect of low rates on wider economic developments:

1. *Credit supply*. Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) and Eggertsson et al. (2019).
2. *Risk taking*. Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), Jiménez et al. (2014), Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017), Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2017), and Heider, Saidi, and Schepens (2019).

Liquidity creation and financial stability.

- Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (1998), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Quadrini (2017), Segura and Suárez (2017), and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2020).

Franchise value of deposits.

- Di Tella and Kurlat (2017) and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018).

What is the effect of low interest rates on financial stability?

Two effects:

- ⊕ Asset-revaluation effect.
- ⊖ Compression of net interest spread.

Main result: There is a tipping-point rate.

- Below tipping point, financial crisis.
- It is function of observable bank characteristics.

Methodological contribution: Recursive Diamond-Dybvig model.

- Clear role of bank's net interest spread for financial stability.
- Endogenous objects stable over time.

Toy version of the model

Framework:

- Infinite horizon with $t = 0, 1, \dots$
- At time 0, the **bank** has B assets and D deposits outstanding.
 - Interest rate on assets is $\rho > 0$. Deposits earn deposit rate d .
 - *Liquidity creation*: $D > B$.
- At each date, the **depositor** withdraws all deposits with probability $\phi \in (0, 1)$.

Bank balance sheet

- $1 + s = \frac{1+\rho}{1+d}$, *net interest spread* (NIS).

The risk-neutral valuation of bank equity e is

$$e = \phi \cdot (B - D) + \phi \cdot (1 - \phi) \cdot \frac{(1 + \rho) \cdot B - (1 + d) \cdot D}{1 + \rho} + \phi \cdot (1 - \phi)^2 \cdot \frac{(1 + \rho)^2 \cdot B - (1 + d)^2 \cdot D}{(1 + \rho)^2} + \dots = \quad (1)$$

$$= B - [1 - f(s)] \cdot D,$$

with *franchise value of deposits* (FVD)

$$f(s) = \underbrace{\frac{1 - \phi}{\phi + s}}_{\text{Expected time to withdrawal}} \times \underbrace{s}_{\text{NIS}}. \quad (2)$$

Assets	Liabilities
B	D
$f(s) \cdot D$	$e(s)$

Bank behaviour & tipping point $\underline{\rho}$

Bank chooses the NIS s

- to set bank equity $e = 0$,
- subject to ZLB $d \geq 0 \implies s \leq \rho$.

→ *Micro-foundation:*

- Exclusive bank-depositor relationship with perfect competition ex-ante.
- Cash as outside option for depositor.

→ Easy to generalise bank behaviour to have $e > 0$.

Target NIS s^* :

$$0 = B - [1 - f(s^*)] \cdot D \quad (3)$$

→ Liquidity creation $\implies s^* > 0$.

Equilibrium NIS:

$$s = \min \{s^*, \rho\}. \quad (4)$$

Proposition 1: Bank is insolvent with $e < 0$ iff $\rho < \underline{\rho}$ where $\underline{\rho} = s^*$.

Tipping point with long-term assets 1/2

- Bank-asset duration $\tau > 0$.

$$e = B(\rho) - [1 - f(s)] \cdot D. \quad (5)$$


Mechanism:

- $\rho \downarrow \implies$
- Erosion of FVD: $\rho < s^* \implies f \downarrow$.
 - Asset-revaluation effect: $B \uparrow$.

- Approximation for τ small enough.

$$\frac{\Delta B}{B} \cong \tau \cdot \ln(1 + d^*). \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{\Delta f}{1 - f} \cong -\frac{\partial f / \partial s}{1 - f} \cdot (\rho - s^*) \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\rho < s^*}. \quad (7)$$



Tipping point with long-term assets, 2/2

Proposition 2

Consider $\tau > 0$ small enough.

The bank is insolvent with $e < 0$ iff $\rho < \underline{\rho}$ where

$$\underline{\rho} = s^* - \underbrace{\frac{\tau}{\frac{\partial f / \partial s}{1-f}}}_{\text{Effective duration gap at ZLB}} \cdot \ln(1 + d^*). \quad (8)$$

$\frac{\partial f / \partial s}{1-f}$ = interest-rate elasticity of the value of deposits once $d = 0$.

→ Interpret it as the *effective duration of deposits at ZLB*.

Quantitative analysis, 1/2

Problem: Find empirical counterpart for effective duration of deposits at ZLB.

Naïve solution: Use statutory duration of bank liabilities of 0.41 years (English, Van den Heuvel, and Zakrajšek 2018).

Complete solution:

Step 1: Find effective duration of deposits in normal times (data 1997-2007).

$$\frac{df/d\rho}{1-f} = \frac{1}{1-e/B} \cdot \underbrace{\left(\tau + \frac{e}{B} \cdot \frac{de/d\rho}{e} \right)}_{4Y + 9\% \cdot (-10Y)} = 3 \text{ years.} \quad (9)$$

Quantitative analysis, 2/2

Step 2: Adjust for zero interest-rate pass-through at ZLB.

$$\frac{\partial f / \partial s}{1 - f} = \underbrace{\frac{df / d\rho}{1 - f}}_{3Y} \cdot \frac{1 + d^*}{1 - (1 + s^*) \cdot dd / d\rho} = 5 \text{ years} \quad (10)$$

- $dd / d\rho = 0.354$ (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl 2018).
- $d^* = 2.54\%$ in September 2007 (M2 own rate).
- $s^* = 2.64\%$ in September 2007.

How low could Ben go?

- What was the tipping-point rate in September 2007, as Federal Reserve started its rate cuts?

$$\underline{\rho} = \underbrace{s^*}_{2.64\%} - \underbrace{\frac{\tau}{\frac{\partial f / \partial s}{1 - f}}}_{0.9} \cdot \underbrace{\ln(1 + d^*)}_{2.54\%} = 0.3\%. \quad (11)$$

Caveats: (1) Permanent unanticipated interest-rate change, (2) No capital buffer.

Microfoundation: recursive banking model

Ingredients:

1. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) but over infinite horizon.
2. Long-term assets and storage.
3. Fundamental runs (Allen and Gale 1998).

Results:

- Two steady states.
 1. Good SS:
 - *Liquidity creation*: $D > B$.
 - Solvent banks: $e = 0$ with $s = s^*$.
 2. Bad SS:
 - No intermediation: $B = 0$.
 - Bankrupt banks: $e < 0$.
- Financial crisis: transition from good SS to bad SS.
 - Iff $e < 0$, economy converges to bad SS.

Conclusion

What is the effect of low interest rates on financial stability?

Theoretical results.

1. Two contrasting effects:
 - ⊕ Asset-revaluation effect.
 - ⊖ Erosion of FVD.
2. Relative strength determines the *tipping-point rate*.
 - It depends on bank's *effective duration gap at the ZLB*.

Quantitative result:

- Effective duration of deposits at ZLB \cong 5 years.
- Asset-revaluation effect much weaker than naïve calculation suggests.

Methodological contribution:

- Diamond-Dybvig model features endogenous FVD.
- Recursive version suitable for quantitative analysis.

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